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1. Introduction
The classic capital structure theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958) implies that corporate
financial activities like hedging are irrelevant if investors (shareholders) can replicate these
activities by themselves. In practice, however, the use of derivative instruments for active
corporate risk management has grown rapidly in recent years (Bartram, Brown, and Fehle,
2009; Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou, 2011; Chen and King, 2014). For example, a survey by
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association in 2009 reports that about 94% of Fortune
Global 500 companies across 32 countries use derivatives to hedge their business and financial
risks. In view of this observation, one of the important questions from both an academic and
practitioner perspective is whether derivatives users experience a lower cost of equity capital
than do non-users. Using a sample of non-financial firms in the United States (US), Gay, Lin,
and Smith (2011) provide evidence that the cost of equity of derivatives users is lower than
non-users. However, little is known about whether such relationship holds outside of the US,
especially in countries where firms face greater exposures to financial price uncertainty, such
as foreign exchange rate risk, and/or different regulatory and institutional environments. The
ultimate benefit of derivative-related activities in terms of a lower cost of equity capital may
not materialize for firms in other countries and knowing this is important in view of the fact
that an increasing amount of corporate resources are expended in pursuing such activities.
In this paper, our main goal is to investigate the impact of derivatives activities on firms’
cost of equity capital by utilizing hand-collected data comprising financial derivative instruments
usage by a sample of German non-financial firms. Specifically, we compute the relative cost of
equity of users and non-users and analyze the source of any difference between the two groups if it
exists. We next explore whether firm size and type of derivatives matter in the relation between
derivatives use and the cost of equity capital. In addition, we examine whether there is any
significant change in the cost of equity experienced by firms that were non-users of derivative
instruments and later initiated derivatives programs for risk management purpose. Finally,
using a firm’s probability of default, we explore whether hedging reduces financial distress risk.
Our choice of a sample of German firms is due to several reasons. First, Germany represents
one of the largest stock markets, by market capitalization, in the world outside of the US.
Second, according to the World Bank, at the end of December 2016, German firms export more
than their US counterparts, which exposes them to higher levels of foreign exchange rate risk.
Consistent with this observation, Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) find that a higher proportion of
German firms compared to US firms use derivative instruments. Consequently, it is likely that
German firms experience a larger impact of derivatives use on their cost of equity capital than
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those in the US. Third, institutional characteristics in Germany are considerably different from
those in the US. For example, in Table 1, we present some key institutional characteristics of
Germany and US. From columns 1 and 2, it can be seen that German firms are less widely held,
which implies a predominance of blockholder ownership structure. On the one hand, this can
lower the cost of equity following the argument of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that blockholders
have greater incentives to monitor a firm’s management in an unbiased way and thereby leading
to a reduction of agency costs and a lower cost of equity. On the other hand, the cost of equity
rises in the presence of large blockholders due to their extraction of private benefits of control
(Ashbaugh, Collins, and LaFond, 2004). Because of these two competing views, it is unclear
what would be the ultimate impact of derivatives use on the cost of equity in the presence of a
concentrated ownership structure. We see in columns 3 and 4 that shareholders in Germany have
lower levels of rights and right enforcement than those in the US. In the absence of higher levels
of shareholder rights and right enforcement, the likelihood of an out-of-court reorganization of
the firm is very low (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). As a result, the
cost of equity capital for German firms are likely to be higher (Hail and Leuz, 2006), which
suggests larger potential benefits from the use of derivatives in terms of cost of equity reduction.
Table 1 also shows that financial transparency in Germany is much lower due to less stringent
equity disclosure requirements by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (see column
5). A lower level of financial transparency increases out-of-pocket monitoring costs borne by
shareholders, which in turn increases the cost of equity capital (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Lombardo
and Pagano, 2002). Looking at column 6, we see that firms in Germany face higher corporate
effective tax rates than firms in the US. In the presence of financial market frictions, taxation
allows a firm to achieve tax-shield benefits from debt financing. Hence, firms in Germany
are likely to be more leveraged and therefore face greater financial distress risk. The use of
derivative instruments is then expected to reduce the cost of equity to a greater extent. German
firms also experience a lower level of bankruptcy efficiency (see column 7). In this connection,
Davydenko and Franks (2008) note that borrowing from multiple banks is much more common
for German firms due to a bank-oriented financial system. As a result, the direct bankruptcy
costs associated with debt renegotiation at the time of default is higher and the renegotiation
process is more difficult, both of which reduce the terminal value of a firm in bankruptcy. In
such case, it is likely that shareholders would require additional risk premiums for bearing
higher financial distress risk than those in a market-oriented financial system. Therefore, in
a German setting we would expect a larger impact of derivatives use in reducing the cost of
equity. The last column of Table 1 shows that the block premium is considerably higher for
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firms in Germany. This implies a higher level of private benefits of control by blockholders and
a consequent agency problem between blockholders and minority/retail shareholders. In such
case, the use of derivatives is expected to cause a larger reduction in the cost of equity capital.
Taken together, all of the above attributes make Germany an interesting laboratory to examine
the relation between firms’ derivatives use and the cost of equity capital.
We compute an estimate of a firm’s cost of equity based on the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model. Our empirical evidence suggests that hedging through derivatives significantly
reduces the cost of equity capital. In univariate analysis, we find that firms using derivatives
have, on average, a 306 basis point lower cost of equity than non-users. Employing an industry-
adjusted estimate, user firms have, on average, a 109 basis point lower cost of equity than non-
users. We also find evidence that derivatives user firms have significantly lower Fama and French
(1993) three-factor betas than do non-user firms. Specifically, user firms have, on average, a
27.22% lower market factor beta, a 42.38% lower small-minus-big size (SMB) factor beta, and a
16.14% lower high-minus-low value (HML) factor beta than non-users. In conjunction with the
corresponding positive factor risk premium estimates, these reductions in betas suggest that the
lower cost of equity of derivatives users is driven by their lower exposures to the market, SMB,
and HML risk factors. Fama and French (1996) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) provide evidence
that the SMB and HML factors contain information regarding a firm’s default risk. Hence, our
empirical results on the contributions of the SMB and HML betas to the reductions in the cost
of equity of user firms is consistent with the notion that hedging through derivatives is linked
with the mitigation of financial distress risk, which in turn leads to lower SMB and HML factor
exposures. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), however, show that although financially
distressed firms have higher SMB and HML factor exposures, they can also have lower average
stock returns when compared to less distressed firms. This casts doubt on the distress risk
representation of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and therefore our reasoning
that firm’s derivatives use is associated with a lowering of financial distress risk proxied by the
SMB and HML factors. To address this concern, we utilize a firm’s expected default frequency
(EDF) as a proxy for financial distress risk and investigate the impact of derivatives use on the
probability of default. The results from this empirical exercise confirm that financial hedging
activities do indeed reduce financial distress risk.
Consistent with the findings of the univariate analysis, our results from the pooled regressions
show that derivatives users experience a significantly lower cost of equity than non-users. One
concern regarding the pooled regressions is that the results could be spurious due to potential
endogeneity arising from a firm’s financial hedging and capital structure decisions. We address
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this concern by examining firms’ cost of equity, derivatives use, and leverage decisions within a
simultaneous equations framework and find a significantly negative relation between derivatives
use and the cost of equity capital. This suggests that the observed impact of financial hedging
activities on the cost of equity cannot be attributed to endogeneity. As a further robustness
check, we conduct a propensity score matching analysis. The results show that derivatives user
firms have, on average, a 111 (75) basis point lower cost of equity (industry-adjusted cost of
equity) than non-user matched firms. Our empirical analysis using the pooled regressions also
reveals that the reduction in the cost of equity capital is largest for smaller firms. A similar
finding emerges for firms making use of foreign currency and interest rate derivative instruments.
Lastly, we find that new user firms experience a reduction in the cost of equity of 246 basis
points in the first year of adoption. The average reduction in the industry-adjusted cost of
equity also remains markedly high at 286 basis points. Notably, these reductions in the cost of
equity capital of new users stem from their lower market, size, and value risk factor exposures.
The main contribution of our paper is to shed light on the potential benefits of risk man-
agement through financial hedging for corporations in a country like Germany, which is largely
characterized by an insider system of corporate governance and bank dominated financing. In
other words, our examination of the impact of derivatives use on the cost of equity for German
non-financial firms provides useful insights to corporations operating in Germany and in coun-
tries alike, in terms of institutional settings, that may consider using derivatives as a means
of lowering their cost of financing capital. Another contribution of this paper is by utilizing
data on EDF we show directly whether German non-financial firms’ derivatives use significantly
reduces the likelihood of financial distress. It is worth highlighting that empirical studies on
the impact of hedging activities on financial distress risk focus almost exclusively on US firms.
The paper related to ours is Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011), who investigate a sample of
US non-financial firms and find that the cost of equity of derivatives user firms is lower than
non-users by 24 to 78 basis points. The authors also find that the reduction in the cost of
equity is attributable to lower market and SMB factor betas. Smaller firms and firms that use
foreign currency and interest rate derivatives experience the largest reductions in the cost of
equity. Although our empirical results are qualitatively similar to those in Gay, Lin, and Smith
(2011), we find a larger impact of derivatives use in reducing the cost of equity capital in a
German setting. In addition, we show directly that firms’ derivatives activities significantly
lower the likelihood of financial distress – evidence that is missing in the aforementioned paper.
Another important paper related to ours is Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011). They show that
derivatives users pay lower interest spreads than non-users and are less likely to have capital
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expenditure restrictions in their loan agreements. Recently, Chen and King (2014) examine
the impact of corporate hedging activities on the cost of public debt and provide evidence that
derivatives use is associated with a lower cost of debt. A common finding of all these empirical
studies is that the use of derivatives significantly reduces a firm’s cost of capital.
Our paper also adds to an extant literature on financial hedging and corporate valuation.
Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine the effect of financial hedging on a sample of US firms
and find foreign currency derivatives use is associated with a 4.87% increase in firm value.
Using a sample of firms in the US airline industry, Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) also
find that hedging increases firm value by as much as 10%. Allayannis, Lel, and Miller (2012)
find evidence that the use of foreign currency derivatives increases firm value in the presence
of a strong governance structure. Further, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Yun (2013) find that hedging
increases firm value. Jin and Jorion (2006), however, provide empirical evidence that hedging
does not affect the market value of firms operating in the US oil and gas industry. Similarly,
Fauver and Naranjo (2010) find a significantly negative relation between derivatives use and firm
value in the presence of greater agency and monitoring problems. We complement and extend
this line of literature by empirically investigating the impact of financial derivatives hedging on
the cost of equity capital outside of the US.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data collection
process and the construction of hedging variables and risk factors and outlines the methodology.
Section 3 summarizes the substantive empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and empirical framework
2.1 Data description
To examine the relation between German firms’ derivatives use and the cost of equity cap-
ital, we use hand-collected data. In particular, we first obtain the annual reports of publicly
listed German non-financial firms available in English from their respective official websites.1
Our sample period spans 1999 to 2009. We then use the following keywords to search for in-
formation on derivatives use and hedging strategies in each of the annual reports: “hedge”,
“derivative”, “market risk”, “exposure”, “foreign”, “currency”, “interest rate”, “commodity”,
“futures”, “option”, “swap”, “risk management”, “forward”, and “financial instrument”. When
we find a keyword, we read the surrounding text to identify if the firm is a derivatives user or
1 We exclude financial firms from our empirical analysis since risk management incentives for financial and
non-financial firms are not necessarily comparable. For example, proprietary trading activities by financial firms
might motivate them to take on speculative derivative positions. Hence, inclusion of financial firms in our analysis
could potentially lead to spurious results.
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not for a given year. If the text surrounding a keyword provides any information on derivatives
use or suggests that the respective firm is using derivative instrument(s) then we consider that
firm-year as a user of derivatives and hand-code it to “1” for the “derivatives use” dummy
variable. We classify a firm-year observation as a derivatives non-user if there is no information
on derivatives use available in the annual report and hand-code it to “0” for the “derivatives
use” dummy variable. Likewise, we also construct dummy variables for each specific category of
the derivative instruments, namely, foreign currency, interest rate, and commodity derivatives.2
Our sample consists of 357 firms with 1984 firm-year observations of which 1388 firm-year
observations show use of derivatives and 596 firm-year observations show non-use. These num-
bers indicate that about 70% of our firm-year observations use derivative instruments. This is
notably a higher percentage of derivatives use compared to many recent studies (see, among
others, Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman, 2007; Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou, 2011; Gay, Lin, and
Smith, 2011). Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) also find from a survey that 78% of German firms
use derivative instruments. Moreover, our sample composition differs from those of prior empir-
ical studies, which predominantly consider large firms (see, for example, Adam and Fernando,
2006; Gay, Lin, and Smith, 2011). In other words, our sample contains both small and large
German non-financial firms. This allows us to avoid possible biased results due to the selection
of large firms only in the empirical analysis.
We retrieve firm-level financial and accounting information from Thomson Reuters via
Datastream. Later, to investigate the relation between derivatives use and financial distress
risk, we source 1- and 5-year EDF values, computed using the KMV-Merton framework due to
Merton (1974), from Moody’s Analytics. Following standard practice in the literature (see, for
example, Fama and French, 2006), all of our continuous explanatory variables are winsorized at
the top and bottom 1% of each variable’s distribution in order to mitigate the undue influence
of outliers on the empirical results. We present descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix
of the firm-level characteristic variables in Tables A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix, respectively.
2.2 Estimating a firm’s cost of equity
Consistent with the literature (see, among others, D’Mello and Shroff, 2000; Gay, Lin, and
Smith, 2011, and references therein), we use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to
2 The reasons to use dummy variables instead of scaled total notional amounts or net derivatives positions
are that the German domestic Generally Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP) prior to 2010 did not have any
specific hedge accounting disclosure requirement. In addition, many German firms adopted the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) after 2009. However, hedge accounting is optional for firms following
IFRS9. Furthermore, neither German GAAP nor IFRS9 requires firms to quantify the notional amount of
derivatives holdings.
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compute the equity premium for each non-financial German firm.3 More precisely, we first run
the following time-series regression using daily returns for firm i in a given year:
Ri,t´Rf,t “ ai`
k“1ÿ
k“´1
bi,kpRM,t`k ´Rf,t`kq`
k“1ÿ
k“´1
si,kSMBt`k `
k“1ÿ
k“´1
hi,kHMLt`k ` ei,t, (1)
where Ri,t is the return for firm i in period t;
4 Rf,t is the return on the risk-free security in period
t;5 and RM,t, SMBt, and HMLt are the returns of the market, size, and value factor mimicking
portfolios, respectively, in time period t.6 The beta coefficients pi.e., bi, si, and hiq represent the
factor sensitivities or loadings and ei,t represents the (zero-mean) regression residual. In the
time-series regression specification given by equation (1), the rationale for including one lead and
lag return in addition to the contemporaneous daily return is to account for infrequent trading
(see Dimson, 1979).7 Accordingly, we obtain each market, SMB, and HML beta as the sum
of the coefficient estimates on the lag, contemporaneous, and lead values of the corresponding
factor risk premiums.
Following Fama and French (1997) and D’Mello and Shroff (2000), we then compute the
cost of equity for each firm-year as an annual risk premium given by
CEi,t “ EpRi,tq ´Rf “ Bˆi,trEpRM q ´Rf s ` Sˆi,tEpSMBq ` Hˆi,tEpHMLq, (2)
where CEi,t is the cost of equity of firm i, and Bˆi,t, Sˆi,t, and Hˆi,t are the estimated betas for the
market, SMB, and HML risk factors, respectively, in period t. For a given year, the expectations
of the RM -Rf , SMB, and HML are the arithmetic average of daily returns of each factor for the
corresponding year. The cost of equity estimates are then annualized by multiplying by 252.
We also compute the industry-adjusted cost of equity of a firm as the difference between its
estimated cost of equity and the median industry cost of equity estimate for a given year.
2.3 Construction of factors
To construct the market, size, and value risk factor mimicking portfolios (i.e., RM , SMB,
and HML), we first collect daily total return indexes (adjusted for stock splits and dividend
3 In the context of German firms, Schrimpf, Schro¨der, and Stehle (2007) find that the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model performs well in explaining the cross-section of stock returns.
4 In our case, daily returns for a given firm are computed using its daily total return index, which is adjusted
for firm’s stock splits and dividend payments. To help establish the robustness of our findings, we also conduct
empirical analysis where weekly returns are used to compute the cost of equity of a firm. The results from this
exercise are similar to the baseline findings of the paper and are reported in Tables A.3 and A.4 of the Appendix.
5 We use one-month money market rate for Germany as a proxy for the return on the risk-free security.
6 Details on the construction of the market, size, and value factors for Germany are provided in Section 2.3.
7 In an unreported analysis, we find that our empirical results are not sensitive to alternative specifications
including no lags or leads.
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payments) of all listed common stocks in Germany irrespective of the Exchanges for the period
between January 1998 to December 2009 from Datastream.8,9 Thereafter, we calculate market
capitalization and book-to-market ratio of a firm’s common stock by following the methods
suggested in Fama and French (1993). Market capitalization is therefore computed as the
number of equity shares outstanding times the price of one share at the end of June in each
year t. In June of year t`1, we recalculate market capitalization. The book-to-market ratio is
calculated in June of each year t as the ratio of the book value of a firm’s common equity at
the end of the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t´1 to the market capitalization of the
stock at the end of December in calendar year t´1. Similar to market capitalization, we also
recalculate book-to-market ratio in June of year t`1.
We compute the daily return for the market risk factor mimicking portfolio as the value-
weighted portfolio return of all aforementioned common stocks. The market capitalization
defined above is used as the weight variable. To construct the size and value risk factor mimick-
ing portfolios, SMB and HML, in any day as per Fama and French (1993), we begin by sorting
all common stocks into two groups. On the last trading day of June in each year t, stocks with
market capitalizations that are lower than the median market capitalization among all available
stocks are assigned to the Small group, while stocks with market capitalizations that are above
the median market capitalization are assigned to the Big group. At the end of June in each
year t, the entire universe of German common stocks is also independently sorted into three
groups based on the book-to-market ratio defined above. The High group holds stocks with
book-to-market ratios above the 70th percentile of book-to-market ratios for all available stocks.
The Medium group contains stocks with book-to-market ratios between the 30th and 70th per-
centiles. The Low group comprises stocks with book-to-market ratios below the 30th percentile.
We then intersect the two market capitalization-based groups and three book-to-market-based
groups to create six portfolios. These portfolios are denoted as Small High, Small Medium,
Small Low, Big High, Big Medium, and Big Low. The Small High portfolio holds stocks in
the intersection of the Small market capitalization group and the High book-to-market ratio
group. Stock compositions of the other five portfolios are analogous. We calculate the daily
8 For Germany, the default search option for “total return index” in Datastream only retrieves the stocks
listed in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). To obtain return information for a stock that is not listed in the
FSE, we first identify the Exchange in which the firm is listed and then use the Exchange code to collect the
total return index data for that firm’s stock. If the firm is cross-listed in the FSE and other Exchanges then we
consider the FSE data only.
9 The Fama and French (1993) three factors for Germany are publicly available in the Humboldt University
of Berlin website (https://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/de/professuren/bwl/bb/data/fama-french-factors-germany/
fama-french-factors-for-germany). However, these factors are constructed using both common and preferred
stocks, and abandon bottom 20% market capitalization firms. This could potentially undermine the size ef-
fect. To overcome this issue, we construct the factors using all publicly listed common stocks. In an unreported
exercise, we find that our empirical results hold even with the three factors available in the aforementioned source.
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return of each of the six portfolios. The stocks within each portfolio are value-weighted, with
the market capitalization at the end of June of year t, used as the weight variable.10
The return of the size factor mimicking portfolio in any trading day is then obtained as
SMB “ 1{3pSmall High` Small Medium` Small Lowq ´ 1{3pBig High`Big Medium`
Big Lowq. On the other hand, the daily return of the value factor mimicking portfolio is com-
puted as HML “ 1{2pSmall High`Big Highq´1{2pSmall Low`Big Lowq. By construction,
the HML portfolio isolates the relation between book-to-market ratio and stock returns while
controlling for the market capitalization effect.
2.4 Multivariate framework
We resort to a multivariate regression framework in which the relation between firms’ cost
of equity capital and their use of derivatives is specified as
CEi,t “ fpDerivatives usei,t, Leveragei,t, Book-to-marketi,t, Illiquidityi,t, Sizei,t,
Number of segmentsi,t,% Segment salesi,s,t, Ownership30i,t, Ownership30
`
i,tq. (3)
Derivatives use is a dummy variable defined earlier in Section 2.1. Our rationale for using
leverage is to proxy for default risk (see Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou, 2011; Lin, Ma, Malatesta,
and Xuan, 2011; Purnanandam, 2008, and references therein). Leverage is defined as long-term
debt plus current portion of long-term debt scaled by total assets. We expect a positive link
between the cost of equity and the level of leverage. Importantly, leverage of a firm depends
on industry-specific characteristics (see Lang, Ofek, and Stulz, 1996). Considering this fact, we
also calculate the industry-adjusted leverage of a firm. For a given year, this is computed as the
difference between a firm’s leverage estimate defined above and the median industry leverage
estimate. In this case, we repeat our empirical analysis using the industry-adjusted cost of
equity, defined in Section 2.2, for consistency. The book-to-market ratio, defined previously, is
included to proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities (see, among others, Bartram, Brown, and
Conrad, 2011; Gay, Lin, and Smith, 2011). Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure,
computed as the ratio of the absolute value of the daily stock return to the daily euro trading
volume of the stock, averaged over all trading days (with non-zero volume) available in a given
year. We expect a positive relation between the cost of equity and illiquidity. Size is defined
as the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm size is expected to be negatively related to
10 Although we update the weights as of the end of June in each year t, the return data for all common
stocks are updated on a trading day basis to compute the daily returns of the market, size, and value risk factor
mimicking portfolios used in the empirical analysis.
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the cost of equity since small firms tend to have higher risk than large firms. We consider
the number of business segments in which a firm operates to proxy for firm’s operational risk
diversification (see Chod, Rudi, and Mieghem, 2010). Diversified firms are exposed to lower
levels of risk than non-diversified firms. We, therefore, expect a negative relation between the
cost of equity capital and the number of segments. We also incorporate the percentage of a
firm’s sales in each industry segment s to control for potential industry effects. Unlike the
US, blockholder ownership is a common phenomenon in Germany (see, among others, Franks
and Mayer, 2001; Gorton and Schmid, 2000).11 Hence, we control for blockholder ownership
by incorporating two ownership dummy variables, namely, ownership30 and ownership30`. In
particular, ownership30 takes the value 1 if a firm’s blockholder ownership is between 10%
and 30% and zero otherwise. Likewise, ownership30` takes the value 1 if a firm’s blockholder
ownership is above 30% and zero otherwise.
We conduct our baseline multivariate analysis using the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression method. However, our statistical inferences can be criticized due to potential endo-
geneity resulting from a firm’s financial hedging and capital structure decisions. In other words,
the pooled OLS estimation of the relation specified by equation (3) assumes that the decision
by a firm to use derivative instruments is exogenous. But in reality, it is more likely to be
an endogenous decision (Gay, Lin, and Smith, 2011). This follows from the well-known debt
capacity argument, put forth in Leland (1998) and Stulz (1986), that hedging increases a firm’s
debt capacity and therefore reduces tax liabilities due to increases in the level of leverage. In
support of this line of reasoning, Graham and Rogers (2002) provide evidence that firms with
higher leverage are more likely to hedge for risk management purpose and that hedging also
leads to a higher level of leverage. Hence, to address the above potential endogeneity problem,
we also examine the cost of equity capital, derivatives use, and leverage decisions of our sample
of non-financial German firms within a simultaneous equations framework. This enables us to
avoid spurious statistical inferences of causality among these crucial decisions.
In line with Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011) and Ge´czy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), we consider
11 The relation between the cost of equity and blockholder ownership is ambiguous in the literature due
to mixed evidence. For example, Ashbaugh, Collins, and LaFond (2004) suggest a positive relation between
the concentrated ownership and the cost of equity due to the extraction of private benefits of control by the
blockholders. In contrast, Attig, Guedhami, and Mishra (2008) show that blockholder ownership reduces the
cost of equity capital by reducing a firm’s agency and information related problems.
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the following specification to model the derivatives use decision:
Derivatives usei,t “ fpLeveragei,t, Book-to-marketi,t, Sizei,t, Number of segmentsi,t,
% Segment salesi,s,t, Quick ratioi,t, Foreign sales to net salesi,t,
Ownership30i,t, Ownership30
`
i,t, Y ear dummiesq. (4)
A strand of literature (see, among others, Bessembinder, 1991; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein,
1993; Rampini and Viswanathan, 2010) suggests that the use of derivative instruments can help
reduce the underinvestment problem of a firm. The book-to-market ratio is incorporated on
the grounds that firms with lower book-to-market ratios (i.e., higher growth opportunities) are
more likely to engage in hedging activities. Hence, we expect a negative link between derivatives
use and the book-to-market ratio. Size is included in our analysis to proxy for economies of
scale in the costs of risk management.12 We make use of a firm’s number of business segments
in which it operates as well as the quick ratio to proxy as substitutes for derivative instruments
use. Firms operating in different business segments are likely to have lower risk due to product
diversification (Gay, Lin, and Smith, 2011). We, therefore, expect a negative association between
derivatives use and the number of business segments. The quick ratio, defined as the ratio of
cash and short-term investments to current liabilities, is also expected to be negatively related
to derivatives use. We utilize the ratio of foreign sales to net sales in order to account for the
foreign currency risk exposure of a firm, which is expected to be positively related to derivatives
use (see Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Lin, Phillips, and Smith, 2008). Once again, we include
ownership30 and ownership30` dummy variables in order to control for blockholder ownership.
Furthermore, the percentage of segment sales and year dummies are incorporated to control for
industry and time effects, respectively.13
We follow studies by Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011), Ge´czy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), and
Titman and Wessels (1988) for the leverage specification. This is given by
Leveragei,t “ fpDerivatives usei,t, Book-to-marketi,t, Sizei,t, Depreciationi,t,
P roperty, plant, and equipmenti,t, Return on assetsi,t, SGA expensesi,t,
% Segment salesi,s,t, Ownership30i,t, Ownership30
`
i,t, Y ear dummiesq. (5)
12 The relation between derivatives use and firm size is inconclusive in the literature. On the one hand, Warner
(1977) shows that the direct costs related to financial distress are less than proportional to firm size. This suggests
that small firms are more likely to participate in hedging activities. On the other hand, Block and Gallagher
(1986) argue that hedging exhibits informational scale economies and that larger firms are more likely to hedge.
13 We also consider an alternative specification of equation (4), where industry dummies replace segment sales
percentages. The results from this unreported analysis are qualitatively similar to those provided in this paper.
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Leland (1998) argues that firms using derivatives can increase their debt capacity by reducing
financial distress. Recent empirical evidence provided by Purnanandam (2008) supports this
argument. We, therefore, expect a positive relation between the level of leverage and derivatives
use. Myers (1977) argues that firms with investment opportunities that could make a positive
net contribution to their market values are more likely to have a lower level of debt. Consistent
with this argument, we expect a positive association between the book-to-market ratio and
leverage. Financial constraints of a firm are proxied by its size (see Adam, 2009). Thus, we
expect firm size to exhibit a positive relation to the level of leverage. Tax related motive
is proxied by the ratio of depreciation expenses to total assets. Depreciation acts as a non-
debt tax shield for firms (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Hence, firms with higher depreciation
expenses will have less incentive to increase their leverage levels. Leverage is dependent on a
firm’s profitability. We include return on assets as a proxy for a firm’s profitability. Return on
assets is computed as the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items to total assets. We expect
return on assets to be negatively related to leverage (see Gay, Lin, and Smith, 2011). Further,
we compute the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses to total assets (referred
to as SGA expenses) as a proxy for the uniqueness of the firm’s products. Firms with relatively
unique line of products are exposed to higher bankruptcy costs (Titman and Wessels, 1988).
Hence, a negative relationship between the level of leverage and the degree of a firm’s uniqueness
is expected. We consider property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets as a proxy for
collateral value. Firms with higher collateral value can have higher leverage and therefore a
positive association between leverage and property, plant, and equipment is expected. Similar
to the model of derivatives use decision given by equation (4), we also control for blockholder
ownership, industry, and time effects. In other words, we include the percentage segment sales,
ownership30, ownership30`, and year dummy variables in our analysis.
3. Empirical results
3.1 Univariate results
Table 2 presents mean and median values of the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost of eq-
uity, and market (i.e., RM´Rf ), SMB, and HML factor betas separately for all firm, derivatives
user, and non-user groups.14 We also report differences in mean and median values between
users and non-users in relation to the aforementioned variables. Our univariate comparison
provides strong evidence that derivatives user German non-financial firms have, on average, a
14 We elaborate on the mean and median values of 1- and 5-year EDF in Section 3.6.
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lower cost of equity over the sample period. A similar empirical finding emerges when we focus
on the industry-adjusted cost of equity estimates. Specifically, derivatives users markedly have
a 306 (299) basis point lower cost of equity than do non-users based on mean (median) values.
Looking at the industry-adjusted estimates, we find that user firms have a 109 (118) basis point
lower cost of equity than do non-users based on mean (median) values. All of these mean and
median difference estimates are economically large and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Further, the mean and median differences in risk factor betas affirm that derivatives user firms
have significantly lower market, SMB, and HML betas than non-users. Considering the market
beta, we observe that derivatives users have an average of 0.8128 versus 1.1169 for non-users.
For the SMB beta, user firms have an average of 0.5023 as compared to the non-user average of
0.8718. Similarly, for the HML beta, derivatives users have an average of 0.3289 versus 0.3922
for non-users. These perceived differences suggest that user firms experience their largest re-
ductions in risk factor betas over non-users from the SMB beta, which is 0.3695 (or 42.38%)
on average. This is followed by reductions in the market and HML factor betas by 0.3040 (or
27.22%) and 0.0633 (or 16.14%), respectively.15
We now elaborate on the relative effect of the differences in the mean values of the factor
betas on the overall difference in the average cost of equity capital between user and non-user
groups. To do so, we first compute the average annual risk premiums over our sample period
for the market, SMB, and HML risk factors. The average annual risk premiums of these factors
are 0.0497, 0.0312, and 0.0620 respectively. We then multiply the risk premium estimate for
each factor by the difference in the mean values of the corresponding factor betas between users
and non-users. This provides us the approximate contribution of each beta component to the
overall difference in the cost of equity. We find that the market beta component contributes to
the reduction in the cost of equity by 151 basis points (´0.3040ˆ0.0497) for derivatives user
firms. The contribution of the SMB beta component to the reduction in the cost of equity is
115 basis points (´0.3695ˆ0.0312) for derivatives users, whereas the contribution of the HML
beta component is 39 basis points (´0.0633ˆ0.0620). These results suggest that the lower cost
of equity for derivatives user firms is driven by their lower exposures to the market, SMB, and
HML risk factors. Our empirical finding on the contributions of the SMB and HML betas to
the significant reduction in the cost of equity of derivatives users is also consistent with the
notion that hedging through the use of derivatives is associated with the alleviation of financial
distress risk, which in turns leads to lower SMB and HML betas.
15 We acknowledge that beta estimates from individual firm regressions can be noisy and therefore it is possible
that derivatives usage could be associated with lower measured backward-looking sensitivities to the Fama-French
factors for Germany rather than expectations of lower sensitivities in the future. We thank an anonymous referee
for pointing this out.
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3.2 Multivariate results
3.2.1 Pooled OLS regression results
We present the results of the estimated relation between firms’ industry-adjusted cost of
equity and their use of derivatives in Table 3.16,17 The specification of our first model (referred
to as model 1) excludes blockholder ownership dummy variables, whereas the specification of
the second model (referred to as model 2) includes them. Starting with model 1, we observe that
the derivatives use dummy is significantly negative at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient
of ´0.0160 indicates that derivatives user firms have a 160 basis point lower cost of equity than
non-users. Said differently, firms that use derivative instruments indeed experience a sizeable
reduction in the cost of equity. It is worth mentioning that Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011) provide
qualitatively similar empirical evidence based on a large sample of US non-financial firms. We
also notice that the estimated coefficients on the control variables have their expected signs
as discussed in Section 2.4. With the exception of the number of segments, all of them are
statistically significant even at the 1% level. Similar empirical findings emerge when focusing on
model 2, which also controls for blockholder ownership. Importantly, the estimated coefficient
of ´0.0139 on the derivatives use dummy variable is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Consistent with Attig, Guedhami, and Mishra (2008), we find a negative relation between the
cost of equity capital and large blockholder ownership. The estimated coefficient of ´0.0183 on
the ownership30` dummy is statistically significant at the 1% level. We note that these baseline
empirical findings also hold when we repeat the entire analysis using lagged firm-level control
variables. To conserve space, these results are not reported in this paper. Furthermore, we only
present results based on model 2 in subsequent sections.
3.2.2 Simultaneous equations results
As pointed out earlier, our empirical findings based on the pooled OLS regressions can be
criticized due to the possibility of a firm’s financial hedging decision being endogenous. In this
section, we address this concern by estimating the industry-adjusted cost of equity, derivatives
use, and industry-adjusted leverage equations within a simultaneous equations framework.18
We utilize a two-stage estimation procedure to obtain the parameter estimates. The first stage
16 The results based on the unadjusted cost of equity are qualitatively similar to those reported in this section;
these are available upon request.
17 All standard errors of coefficient estimates are adjusted for simultaneous clustering on firm and year to avoid
inflated t-statistics.
18 To conserve space, the results from the simultaneous equations analysis based on the unadjusted cost of
equity, derivatives use, and unadjusted leverage are omitted in this paper. These results, qualitatively similar to
those reported in this section, are available upon request.
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proceeds by separately running an OLS regression for the industry-adjusted leverage and a pro-
bit regression for the derivatives use decision. The second stage involves estimating a structural
equation where the relevant explanatory variables are replaced with the corresponding predicted
values obtained from the first-stage regressions.19 The results reported in Table 4 suggest that
our preceding baseline empirical findings hold even after accounting for potential endogeneity.
Importantly, we observe a negative relation between the cost of equity capital and a firm’s
derivatives use. The estimated coefficient of ´0.0236 on the derivatives use dummy variable is
statistically significant at the 1% level. We emphasize that this is higher than the corresponding
coefficient of ´0.0203 in Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011). Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient
estimate is consistent with our a priori expectations that the impact of derivatives use on the
cost of equity capital in a German setting is likely to be higher than a US setting because of
key institutional differences as shown in Table 1. Specifically, in a German institutional setting
where shareholder rights are lower and creditor rights are higher, there is generally a greater
likelihood of a firm entering liquidation proceedings, greater costs of bankruptcy and therefore
higher expected costs of financial distress. For example, the German bankruptcy code provides
creditors with the ability to liquidate after the compulsory stay of three months has been ex-
hausted, whereas in Chapter 11 there are strong automatic stay provisions. All of these would
imply a greater incentive to hedge for German firms because of a larger potential reduction in
the costs of financial distress. In view of this, our finding of a larger impact of derivatives use
on the cost of equity capital in a German setting compared to that in the US is not surprising.
Furthermore, the relatively large impact of derivatives on the cost of equity could be due
to one or more of the following reasons. First, as pointed out by Guay and Kothari (2003),
firms might also be conducting operational hedging activities at the same time as their financial
derivatives hedging. In such case, our estimate might be capturing both effects generating
a relatively large reduction in the cost of equity capital. Second, the period of our study
includes the bursting of the “dot-com bubble” around the time of the millennium, a string
of audit scandals, rising commodity prices, and the 2007–2009 global financial crisis resulting
in a prolonged period of heightened economic uncertainty. In this environment, financial risk
mitigation through derivatives could have had a larger impact. Lastly, the volatility of the
nominal effective exchange rate for the euro during the period of our study is 13% higher than
the period from 2010 to 2017, suggesting a period of elevated exchange rate volatility. This
might also go some way in explaining our empirical results.
When looking at the derivatives use model specified by equation (4), we find that the
19 We also incorporate year dummies to control for time effects while estimating the cost of equity equation
within the simultaneous equations system.
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industry-adjusted leverage, firm size, and foreign sales to net sales variables, and the ownership30`
dummy variable are positively related to the derivatives use decision. As expected, the quick
ratio is negatively related to a firm’s derivatives use. The estimated coefficients on these vari-
ables are also statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. Consistent with Ge´czy, Minton, and
Schrand (1997) and Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011), we do not find a significant relation between
the derivatives hedging decision and the book-to-market ratio. A similar conclusion emerges
both for the number of segments variable and the ownership30 dummy variable.
For the leverage specification, we see a significantly positive relation between the industry-
adjusted leverage and derivatives use. This empirical finding is consistent with the well-known
debt capacity argument raised in Leland (1998). Firm size and property, plant, and equipment
are positively correlated with the industry-adjusted leverage. As expected, return on assets and
depreciation are negatively correlated with the level of leverage. However, we do not find a
significant relation between the industry-adjusted leverage and SGA expenses. A statistically
insignificant relation with the industry-adjusted leverage also appears for our blockholder own-
ership dummy variables. Finally, we cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments
are valid and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation: the
p-value of the Sargan-Hansen statistic exceeds 10%.
3.2.3 Propensity score matching results
In Table A.1 of the Appendix, it can be seen that there are significant differences in the
characteristics of derivatives user and non-user firms. As a result, our earlier finding that
derivatives use reduces the cost of equity capital may suffer from a sample selection bias. We
now investigate this issue by conducting a matching analysis. In particular, we first obtain the
predicted probabilities (propensity scores) of derivatives use computed from a probit regression
model given by equation (4). We then match (without replacement) user firms with non-users
on the basis of their (estimated) propensity to use financial derivatives. Table 5 presents mean
and median values of the variables that we examine in Table 2 for derivatives users and non-
users, but matched on their propensity scores. Looking at the mean (median) values, we notice
that firms that use derivatives have a significant 111 (115) basis point lower cost of equity than
matched firms that do not. We also find that user firms have a significant 75 (83) basis point
lower industry-adjusted cost of equity than non-user matched firms based on mean (median)
values. Furthermore, derivatives user firms have significantly lower market, SMB, and HML
factor betas than non-users. All these empirical results, consistent with those reported in
Tables 2 through 4, mitigate concerns of a potential sample selection bias.
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3.3 Effects of firm size
To further deepen our understanding of the preceding empirical findings, we now investigate
the effect of firm size on the relation between derivatives use and the cost of equity capital. In
each year, we assign our sample of German non-financial firms to size terciles. By construction,
tercile 1 (tercile 3) comprises the smallest (largest) one-third of the sample firms. We present
the results of the univariate analysis in Table 6. In Panel A for the sample of smaller firms
(tercile 1), we see that derivatives users have a 237 (211) basis point lower cost of equity than
non-users based on difference in mean (median) values, an estimate statistically significant at
the 1% level. For the industry-adjusted estimates, users have a 94 (104) basis point lower cost
of equity than non-users based on mean (median) values. We also observe that user firms have
significantly lower risk factor betas than non-users. For example, the average market, SMB, and
HML betas for the user group are 1.0523, 0.5423, and 0.3172, respectively. The corresponding
estimates for the non-user group are, respectively, 1.1959, 0.9144, and 0.3968.
In Panel B for mid-size firms (tercile 2), we find that derivatives users have a 141 (149)
basis point lower cost of equity than non-users based on mean (median) values. Also, firms that
use derivatives have a 61 (60) basis point lower industry-adjusted cost of equity than non-users
based on mean (median) values. These differences in mean (median) values between user and
non-user groups are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. More so, derivatives user firms
have lower market, SMB, and HML factor betas than non-users. But the mean and median
differences in HML beta are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. For the sample
of larger firms (tercile 3) in Panel C, the estimated cost of equity of user firms is significantly
lower than that of non-users by 96 (89) basis points based on mean (median) values. Moreover,
derivatives user firms have a significantly lower HML beta than do non-users.
The empirical results in Table 6 also offer evidence that both the unadjusted and industry-
adjusted cost of equity estimates are decreasing in firm size. This is consistent with our earlier
results, reported in Tables 3 and 4, which show that a firm’s cost of equity capital is negatively
correlated with its size. Furthermore, Table 6 demonstrates that the mean and median values
for the market, SMB, and HML factor betas are decreasing in firm size.
Using a multivariate framework, we now examine the relation between firms’ industry-
adjusted cost of equity and their use of derivatives broken down into size terciles. Table 7
presents the results from the pooled OLS regressions. We observe, for the sample of smaller
firms (tercile 1), that the estimated coefficient of ´0.0215 on the derivatives use dummy variable
is statistically significant at the 1% level. This coefficient estimate suggests that user firms in
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the smaller tercile have a lower cost of equity than non-users.20 Similar to that in Gay, Lin,
and Smith (2011), we do not find a significantly negative association between the cost of equity
capital and derivative instruments use for the samples of mid-size (tercile 2) and larger (tercile
3) firms. This finding is consistent with the fact that as larger firms tend to be more diversified
in both a product and geographical sense, they possess lower residual financial price exposure.
Consequently, they are likely to use financial derivatives less intensely than smaller firms, such
as hedging selectively, resulting in a lesser impact on the cost of equity capital.
3.4 Type of derivatives use
In the context of the relation between German firm’s hedging activities, through the deriva-
tives use, and the cost of equity, it is also interesting to know whether the type of derivatives
matters. To shed light on this issue, we repeat our baseline pooled OLS regression analysis
by instead including three separate dummy variables for foreign currency, interest rate, and
commodity derivatives use. Table 8 presents the results based on the industry-adjusted cost
of equity. We see that the estimated coefficients of ´0.0094 and ´0.0032, respectively, on the
foreign currency and interest rate derivatives use dummies are statistically significant. This in
turn implies that the use of both derivatives contributes to the overall reduction in firms’ cost of
equity. More so, the estimated coefficient on the foreign currency derivatives use is significantly
higher in absolute terms than that of the interest rate derivatives use coefficient. The p-value
for the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal is 0.0487. This finding is not
surprising considering the fact that listed German firms export a significant share of their out-
put outside of the European Union, which exposes them to higher levels of exchange rate risk
as compared to their exposure to interest rate movements. However, our estimated coefficient
of ´0.0016 on the commodity derivatives use dummy variable is statistically indistinguishable
from zero at conventional levels.21 In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that the use of
foreign currency and, to a lesser extent, interest rate derivatives helps reduce the cost of equity
estimates for derivatives user German non-financial firms in our sample. We note that Gay,
Lin, and Smith (2011) also report a similar finding in the context of US non-financial firms.
3.5 New users of derivatives
In our preceding empirical analysis, one could argue that derivatives non-user group is not
an appropriate benchmark for comparing users due to differences in firm-level characteristics.
20 We find qualitatively similar results in an unreported exercise based on the unadjusted cost of equity.
21 The results based on the unadjusted cost of equity are qualitatively similar to those reported in this section.
To conserve space, these are omitted in this paper.
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To help mitigate this concern, we also investigate the change in the cost of equity capital
experienced by firms that were non-users of derivatives and subsequently initiated derivatives
programs. Following Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011), a firm is categorized as a new user of derivative
instrument(s) if it reports derivatives use in year t, but does not report a position in derivatives
prior to year t during our sample period. This classification gives us a sub-sample of 86 non-
financial firms that are identified as new users of derivatives.
Table 9 presents mean and median changes in the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost
of equity, and market, SMB, and HML factor betas. Consistent with our baseline empirical
results, we find that new users experience a significant mean (median) reduction in the cost of
equity of 246 (253) basis points in the first year of adoption. The mean and median reductions
in the industry-adjusted cost of equity are, respectively, 286 and 287 basis points. Both of
these estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. New user firms also experience a
significant mean (median) reduction in their market, SMB, and HML factor betas.22
3.6 Derivatives use and financial distress risk
In Section 3.1, we find that the cost of equity of derivatives users is significantly lower
than that of non-users. This reduction is attributable to user firms having significantly lower
market, SMB, and HML factor betas. Fama and French (1996) argue that the slopes on SMB
and HML factors proxy for relative financial distress. Consistent with this argument, Vassalou
and Xing (2004) provide empirical evidence that the Fama and French (1993) factors SMB and
HML contain information regarding default risk. Thus, our empirical finding is consistent with
the idea that the use of derivative instruments by firms is linked with the alleviation of their
financial distress risk, which in turn leads to lower SMB and HML factor betas. Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), however, show that although firms with higher financial distress
risk have higher SMB and HML betas, they can also have lower average stock returns than do
firms with relatively low financial distress. Hence, the distress risk representation of the Fama
and French (1993) three-factor model is incongruent. In this regard, our reasoning, based on the
empirical finding in Section 3.1, that derivatives hedging reduces financial distress risk which
in turn lowers cost of equity can be criticized due to proxy selection. We address this concern,
in this section, by using both 1- and 5- year EDF values as a proxy for financial distress risk
of firms to investigate the impact of hedging activities on the probability of default.23 More
22 We acknowledge that there is a possibility that our empirical analysis of new derivatives users is affected by
endogeneity. Ideally, we would like to conduct an analysis of new users in a multivariate setting. But due to the
lack of publicly available data on the notional amount of derivatives use, we are unable to employ an effective
measure of the change in the extent of financial derivatives use.
23 The 1-year (5-year) EDF value is defined as the probability that a firm will default in 1-year (5-year) time.
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precisely, we resort to the following model specification:
EDFi,t “ fpDerivatives usei,t, Leveragei,t, Illiquidityi,t, Sizei,t, Return on assetsi,t,
Quick ratioi,t, Excess returni,t, Equity volatilityi,tq. (6)
Along the lines of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Smith and Stulz (1985), we expect
that derivatives user firms have a lower EDF than non-users. Firms with a higher level of
leverage are exposed to a higher level of financial distress risk. Thus, we expect a positive
association between EDF and leverage. Disproportional effect of firm size on financial distress
as argued by Warner (1977) suggests that size is negatively related to EDF. Firms with higher
return on assets are more likely to have lower EDF and therefore a negative relation between
them is expected. Recently, Brogaard, Li, and Xia (2017) show that the higher stock-level
liquidity reduces financial distress risk. We expect a positive association between EDF and
illiquidity. In relation to the quick ratio, Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) find that
firms with a lower quick ratio are more likely to have a higher probability of default. Following
Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Brogaard, Li, and Xia (2017), we also consider excess return,
which is computed as the difference between a stock’s annual return and annual return on our
value-weighted market portfolio constructed in Section 2.3. Finally, equity volatility is obtained
as the standard deviation over one year of daily returns and then annualized by multiplying by
?
252. We expect equity volatility to exhibit a positive association with EDF.
Before moving to the multivariate analysis, we briefly discuss the univariate results of the
differences in mean and median values of both 1-year and 5-year EDF between the derivatives
user and non-user groups. From Table 2, it is observable that the mean (median) values of
1-year and 5-year EDF for user firms are lower than non-users, respectively, by 1.16 (1.82)
percentage points and 1.11 (1.89) percentage points. Importantly, these estimates are statis-
tically significant even at the 1% level. We report the univariate results for derivatives user
and non-user firms broken down into size terciles in Table 6. In all size terciles, firms that use
derivative instruments have significantly lower 1-year and 5-year EDF compared to non-users
based on mean (median) values. Moreover, both mean and median values for 1- and 5-year
EDF are decreasing in firm size. In sum, the univariate results suggest that our sample user
firms have lower default probabilities than non-users. This observation is consistent with the
notion that the use of derivatives helps lowering the cost of equity capital by mitigating the
financial distress risk. Table 9 shows that new user firms also experience significant mean and
median reductions in their 1- and 5-year EDF values.
We now turn our attention to the pooled OLS regression results of the relation between
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firms’ EDF and their use of derivative instruments in Table 10. In the model for 1-year EDF
as the dependent variable, the derivatives use dummy appears to be statistically significant
even at the 1% level and negatively associated with the probability of default. Specifically,
the estimated coefficient of ´0.0284 implies that derivatives user firms have a 2.84 percentage
point lower probability of default in 1-year time as compared to non-users. Consistent with the
finding of the univariate analysis in Table 6, there is a significantly negative relation between
firm’s probability of default (in 1-year time) and its size. The estimated coefficients on other
firm-level control variables also have their predicted signs and are statistically significant at the
1% or 5% level. We observe qualitatively similar results for the model utilizing 5-year EDF as
the dependent variable. Notably, the estimated coefficient of ´0.0215 on the derivatives use
dummy variable is significant at the 1% level. Consistent with Brogaard, Li, and Xia (2017),
the industry-adjusted leverage, equity volatility, and illiquidity are positively correlated with
the probability of default. We also find similar results when we repeat the above pooled OLS
regression analysis using lagged firm-level control variables.
Next, we estimate the EDF, derivatives use, and industry-adjusted leverage equations within
a simultaneous equations framework. The parameter estimates are obtained using a two-stage
procedure. In the first-stage, we separately run an OLS regression for the industry-adjusted
leverage and a probit regression for the derivatives use decision. In the second stage, we esti-
mate structural equations, in which the explanatory variables of concern are replaced with the
predicted values from the first-stage regressions. Table 11 presents the results of this empirical
examination. We find that our earlier results in Table 10 based on the pooled OLS regressions
hold after accounting for potential endogeneity related to a firm’s derivatives use and capital
structure decisions. Importantly, we find that the probability of default in 1-year (5-year) time
is negatively associated with derivatives use. For the 1-year (5-year) EDF model, our estimated
coefficient of ´0.0239 (´0.0223) on the derivatives use dummy variable is statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level. Finally, looking at the results based on the propensity score matching
in Table 5, we find that firms that use derivatives have significantly lower EDF values than
matched firms that do not. Taken altogether, these results show that our reasoning, due to the
finding in Section 3.1, that derivatives hedging activities mitigate financial distress risk remain
valid to the choice of alternative proxy for a firm’s distress risk.
4. Conclusion
Despite the widespread use of derivatives for active corporate risk management, there is
hardly any empirical evidence available regarding the impact of financial hedging on the cost of
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equity outside of a US setting. This paper examines the relation between firms’ derivatives use
and the cost of equity capital for a sample of German non-financial firms. We use hand-collected
data on derivatives hedging and compute a firm’s cost of equity capital based on the Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model. Our univariate analysis shows that user firms experience, on
average, 306 basis points lower cost of equity than non-users. When considering the industry-
adjusted estimate, derivatives users still enjoy, on average, a 109 basis point lower cost of equity.
We also find that the reduction in the cost of equity of derivatives user firms is attributable to
their lower market, size, and value factor betas. This observation is consistent with the notion
that a firm’s use of derivative instruments is associated with the lowering of financial distress
risk and this distress risk has a systematic component, which is priced in the cross-section of
stock returns. Subsequently, using a firm’s expected default frequency as a proxy for financial
distress, we support our evidence on the cost of equity capital by showing that derivatives use
significantly reduces the likelihood of financial distress for German non-financial firms.
Our finding of a negative relation between derivatives use and the cost of equity capital
remains robust to multivariate specifications and specifications that account for potential endo-
geneity arising from a firm’s derivatives hedging and capital structure decisions. Our empirical
analysis also reveals that the reduction in the cost of equity capital is largest for smaller firms
and for firms that use foreign currency and interest rate derivative instruments. We find that
new user firms experience a significant reduction in the cost of equity in the first year of adop-
tion. The reduction in the cost of equity stems from lower exposures to the market, size, and
value risk factors. In sum, our examination of the impact of derivatives use on the cost of equity
provides useful insights for corporations wishing to use derivatives as a means of reducing their
cost of financing capital.
Appendix
Tables A.1–A.4.
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Table 1
Institutional characteristics
The table reports some key country-specific institutional characteristics. Widely held indicates the proportion
of firms that are owned by large number of shareholders and not restricted to handful of shareholders.
Columns 1 and 2 showing proportions, respectively, for large and medium size firms are sourced from La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). Column 3 shows the index of shareholder rights, which ranges
between zero and five, and is sourced from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). Column 4
shows the quality of shareholder right enforcement, which is the average of ex ante and ex post private control
of self-dealing. Column 5 shows the index of equity disclosure, which is the arithmetic average of compensation,
prospectus, shareholders, inside ownership, contracts irregular, and transactions. Country-specific institutional
characteristics reported in columns 4 and 5 are, respectively, sourced from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2008) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). Column 6 shows the first-year corporate
effective tax rate (in %). Column 7 reports the bankruptcy efficiency, which is the present value of the terminal
value of the firm after bankruptcy costs. Country-specific institutional characteristics reported in columns 6
and 7 are sourced from Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008). Column 8 reports the block premium,
which is the difference between the price per share for the control block at announcement day t and the price
on the Exchange at day t+2, divided by the price on the Exchange after the announcement and multiplied by
the proportion of cash flow rights in the controlling block. Block premia reported in column 8 are sourced from
Dyck and Zingales (2004).
Widely held Shareholder Shareholder right Equity Tax Bankruptcy Block
Large Medium rights enforcement disclosure rate efficiency premium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Germany 0.50 0.10 1 0.28 0.42 23.50 57.00 0.10
United States 0.80 0.90 5 0.65 1.00 18.19 85.80 0.01
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Table 2
Univariate comparison of derivatives users and non-users
The table reports mean and median values of the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost of equity, and market, small-minus-big (SMB), and high-minus-low (HML) factor
betas, and expected default frequency (EDF) for a sample of derivatives user and non-user German non-financial firms. The cost of equity of a firm is computed as the
difference between its expected return and the risk-free rate using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. The industry-adjusted cost of equity of a firm is obtained
as the difference between its estimated cost of equity and the median industry estimate for a given year. Market, SMB, and HML betas are the betas, respectively, related
to the market risk premium, and SMB and HML risk factors. 1-year (5-year) EDF is the probability that a firm will default in 1-year (5-year) time. N is the number of
firm-year observations. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is from 1999 to 2009.
Variable All firms Derivatives users Derivatives non-users Difference tests
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
t-test Wilcoxon test
Cost of equity 1984 0.0856 0.0851 1388 0.0765 0.0761 596 0.1070 0.1060 ´0.0306*** ´0.0299***
Industry-adjusted cost of equity 1984 0.0054 0.0061 1388 0.0021 0.0025 596 0.0130 0.0143 ´0.0109*** ´0.0118***
Market beta 1984 0.9041 0.9398 1388 0.8128 0.8334 596 1.1169 1.1876 ´0.3040*** ´0.3542***
SMB beta 1984 0.6133 0.5668 1388 0.5023 0.4543 596 0.8718 0.8289 ´0.3695*** ´0.3746**
HML beta 1984 0.3480 0.3337 1388 0.3289 0.3310 596 0.3922 0.3401 ´0.0633** ´0.0092*
1-year EDF 1984 0.0123 0.0114 1388 0.0088 0.0060 596 0.0205 0.0242 ´0.0116*** ´0.0182***
5-year EDF 1984 0.0132 0.0126 1388 0.0099 0.0069 596 0.0210 0.0259 ´0.0111*** ´0.0189***29
Table 3
Derivatives use and the industry-adjusted cost of equity:
Pooled OLS regressions
The table reports the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of the relation between a sample
of German non-financial firms’ industry-adjusted cost of equity and their use of derivatives. The dependent
variable is the industry-adjusted cost of equity. Derivatives use is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a
firm reports the use of any type of derivatives (i.e., foreign currency, interest rate, or commodity derivatives)
and zero otherwise. The industry-adjusted leverage of a firm is computed as the difference between its leverage,
measured as the ratio of long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt to total assets, and the
median industry leverage for a given year. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of a firm’s common
stock to its market value. Illiquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, obtained as the ratio of the
absolute value of the daily stock return to the daily euro trading volume of the stock, averaged over all trading
days (with non-zero volume) in a given year. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Number of segments is
the number of business segments in which a firm operates. Ownership30 takes the value 1 if a firm’s blockholder
ownership is between 10% and 30% and zero otherwise. Ownership30` takes the value 1 if a firm’s blockholder
ownership is above 30% and zero otherwise. The ratio of each segment sales to total sales is also incorporated in
the pooled OLS regressions. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for simultaneous clustering
on firm and year. Model 1 excludes the blockholder ownership dummy variables, whereas model 2 includes them.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See also notes to Table 2.
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.0281*** 0.0273***
(0.0074) (0.0077)
Derivatives use ´0.0160*** ´0.0139***
(0.0025) (0.0024)
Industry-adjusted leverage 0.0499*** 0.0562***
(0.0033) (0.0041)
Book-to-market 0.0704*** 0.0640***
(0.0086) (0.0091)
Illiquidity 0.0411*** 0.0365***
(0.0074) (0.0073)
Size ´0.0389*** ´0.0370***
(0.0082) (0.0077)
Number of segments ´0.0030 ´0.0033
(0.0020) (0.0021)
Ownership30 ´0.0069
(0.0102)
Ownership30` ´0.0183***
(0.0053)
Number of observations 1855
Number of derivatives users 1331
Number of derivatives non-users 524
Adjusted R2 0.0441 0.0549
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Table 4
Derivatives use and the industry-adjusted cost of equity:
Simultaneous equations analysis
The table reports results of the relation between firms’ industry-adjusted cost of equity, derivatives use, and
industry-adjusted leverage, estimated within a simultaneous equations framework. In the first stage, an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression for the industry-adjusted leverage and a probit regression for the derivatives
use decision are run separately. In the second stage, a structural equation is estimated where the relevant
explanatory variables are replaced with the predicted values from the first-stage regressions. Quick ratio is the
ratio of cash and short-term investments to current liabilities. Foreign sales to net sales is the percentage of
foreign sales to net sales. Property, plant, and equipment is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total
assets. Depreciation is the ratio of depreciation expenses to total assets. Return on assets is computed as the
ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets. SGA expenses are computed as the ratio of selling,
general, and administrative expenses to net sales. The regressions also include the ratio of each segment sales
to total sales as well as year dummies to control for industry and time effects. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors. See also notes to Tables 2 and 3.
Dependent variable: Cost of equity Derivatives Leverage
Variable/estimation method OLS Probit OLS
Intercept 0.0315** ´1.7747*** 0.0588*
(0.0127) (0.3628) (0.0314)
Endogenous variables
Derivatives use ´0.0236*** 0.0446***
(0.0095) (0.0191)
Industry-adjusted leverage 0.1240*** 0.2406***
(0.0058) (0.0558)
Exogenous variables
Book-to-market 0.0640*** ´0.1883 0.0559***
(0.0160) (0.1526) (0.0171)
Illiquidity 0.0406***
(0.0152)
Size ´0.0997*** 0.4840*** 0.0373***
(0.0199) (0.0783) (0.0045)
Number of segments ´0.0037 ´0.0056
(0.0033) (0.0071)
Quick ratio ´0.0693**
(0.0321)
Foreign sales to net sales 1.6216***
(0.3375)
Property, plant, and equipment 0.2363***
(0.0424)
Depreciation ´0.4206*
(0.2216)
Return on assets ´0.1460**
(0.0626)
SGA expenses ´0.0686
(0.0494)
Ownership30 ´0.0103 ´0.0187 0.0277
(0.0124) (0.0198) (0.0179)
Ownership30` ´0.0265** 0.0399** 0.0216
(0.0135) (0.0181) (0.0153)
Number of observations 1855
Number of derivatives users 1331
Number of derivatives non-users 524
Adjusted R2 0.0943 0.1296
Log-likelihood ´781.1006
Sargan-Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.2185
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Table 5
Matched-sample tests
The table reports mean and median values of the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost of equity, and market, small-minus-big (SMB), and high-minus-low (HML) factor
betas, and expected default frequency (EDF) for a sample of derivatives user and non-user German non-financial firms matched on the basis of their (estimated) propen-
sity to use derivatives. The predicted probabilities (propensity scores) of derivatives use are computed using the probit model specified by equation (4). See also notes to Table 2.
Variable Derivatives users Derivatives non-users Difference tests
N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
t-test Wilcoxon test
Cost of equity 341 0.0829 0.0847 0.0940 0.0962 ´0.0111*** ´0.0115***
Industry-adjusted cost of equity 341 0.0063 0.0071 0.0138 0.0154 ´0.0075*** ´0.0083***
Market beta 341 0.9311 0.9324 1.0493 1.0521 ´0.1182*** ´0.1197***
SMB beta 341 0.4955 0.5136 0.5813 0.5989 ´0.0858*** ´0.0853***
HML beta 341 0.2481 0.2516 0.2899 0.2977 ´0.0418*** ´0.0461***
1-year EDF 341 0.0056 0.0057 0.0174 0.0183 ´0.0118*** ´0.0126***
5-year EDF 341 0.0060 0.0063 0.0182 0.0189 ´0.0122*** ´0.0126***
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Table 6
Univariate comparison of derivatives users and non-users: Size terciles
The table reports mean and median values of the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost of equity, and market, small-minus-big (SMB), and high-minus-low (HML) factor betas,
and expected default frequency (EDF) for a sample of derivatives user and non-user German non-financial firms broken down into size terciles. In Panel A, tercile 1 contains
666 firm-year observations of which 203 report using derivatives and 463 report non-use. In Panel B, tercile 2 contains 660 firm-year observations of which 583 report using
derivatives and 77 report non-use. In Panel C, tercile 3 contains 658 firm-year observations of which 602 report using derivatives and 56 report non-use. See also notes to Table 2.
Variable All firms Derivatives users Derivatives non-users Difference tests
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
t-test Wilcoxon test
Panel A: Tercile 1 (the smallest 1/3 of the sample firms)
Cost of equity 0.1053 0.1049 0.0889 0.0902 0.1126 0.1113 ´0.0237*** ´0.0211***
Industry-adjusted cost of equity 0.0124 0.0135 0.0059 0.0063 0.0153 0.0167 ´0.0094*** ´0.0104***
Market beta 1.1521 1.2285 1.0523 1.0989 1.1959 1.2853 ´0.1436*** ´0.1864***
SMB beta 0.8010 0.7490 0.5423 0.4889 0.9144 0.8631 ´0.3721*** ´0.3742***
HML beta 0.3725 0.3300 0.3172 0.3278 0.3968 0.3310 ´0.0796*** ´0.0032*
1-year EDF 0.0185 0.0235 0.0107 0.0130 0.0219 0.0281 ´0.0112*** ´0.0151***
5-year EDF 0.0194 0.0247 0.0123 0.0137 0.0225 0.0299 ´0.0102*** ´0.0162***
Panel B: Tercile 2 (the middle 1/3 of the sample firms)
Cost of equity 0.0829 0.0829 0.0812 0.0811 0.0953 0.0960 ´0.0141*** ´0.0149**
Industry-adjusted cost of equity 0.0048 0.0043 0.0041 0.0036 0.0102 0.0096 ´0.0061** ´0.0060**
Market beta 0.8635 0.8910 0.8551 0.8812 0.9273 0.9650 ´0.0722*** ´0.0838***
SMB beta 0.5485 0.4919 0.5217 0.4613 0.7513 0.7234 ´0.2296*** ´0.2621***
HML beta 0.3683 0.3748 0.3619 0.3700 0.4164 0.4109 ´0.0545 ´0.0409
1-year EDF 0.0111 0.0083 0.0100 0.0075 0.0198 0.0146 ´0.0098** ´0.0071**
5-year EDF 0.0118 0.0096 0.0107 0.0087 0.0200 0.0165 ´0.0093** ´0.0078**
Panel C: Tercile 3 (the largest 1/3 of the sample firms)
Cost of equity 0.0685 0.0673 0.0677 0.0665 0.0773 0.0754 ´0.0096** ´0.0089*
Industry-adjusted cost of equity ´0.0012 0.0002 ´0.0011 0.0002 ´0.0018 0.0007 0.0007 ´0.0005
Market beta 0.6939 0.6966 0.6911 0.6976 0.7240 0.6861 ´0.0329 0.0115
SMB beta 0.4884 0.4576 0.4701 0.4539 0.6851 0.6911 ´0.2150 ´0.2252
HML beta 0.3027 0.2962 0.3010 0.2942 0.3214 0.3181 ´0.0204* ´0.0239*
1-year EDF 0.0073 0.0024 0.0071 0.0021 0.0095 0.0051 ´0.0024* ´0.0030*
5-year EDF 0.0084 0.0031 0.0083 0.0029 0.0100 0.0053 ´0.0017* ´0.0024*
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Table 7
Derivatives use and the industry-adjusted cost of equity:
Pooled OLS regressions for size terciles
The table reports the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of the relation between a
sample of German non-financial firms’ industry-adjusted cost of equity and their use of derivatives broken
down into size terciles. The dependent variable is the industry-adjusted cost of equity. Numbers in paren-
theses are standard errors corrected for simultaneous clustering on firm and year. See also notes to Tables 2 and 3.
Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3
Intercept 0.0245*** 0.0031 ´0.0074
(0.0057) (0.0086) (0.0094)
Derivatives use ´0.0215*** ´0.0111 ´0.0026
(0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0070)
Industry-adjusted leverage 0.0311*** 0.0321*** 0.0167*
(0.0085) (0.0120) (0.0101)
Book-to-market 0.0240** 0.0250** 0.0161***
(0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0052)
Illiquidity 0.0472*** 0.0132*** 0.0126**
(0.0160) (0.0038) (0.0060)
Number of segments ´0.0040 ´0.0033 ´0.0037
(0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0050)
Ownership30 ´0.0054 ´0.0047 0.0016
(0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0119)
Ownership30` ´0.0143** ´0.0150** 0.0027
(0.0067) (0.0075) (0.0076)
Number of observations 621 618 616
Number of derivatives users 178 570 592
Number of derivatives non-users 443 48 24
Adjusted R2 0.0985 0.0731 0.0675
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Table 8
Type of derivatives use and the industry-adjusted cost of equity
The table reports the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of the relation between a sample
of German non-financial firms’ industry-adjusted cost of equity and the type of derivatives use. The dependent
variable is the industry-adjusted cost of equity. Currency is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm
reports the use of foreign currency derivatives and zero otherwise. Interest is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if a firm reports the use of interest rate derivatives and zero otherwise. Commodity is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reports the use of commodity derivatives and zero otherwise. The
ratio of each segment sales to total sales is also incorporated in the pooled OLS regression. Numbers in paren-
theses are standard errors corrected for simultaneous clustering on firm and year. See also notes to Tables 2 and 3.
Intercept 0.0210***
(0.0063)
Currency ´0.0094***
(0.0025)
Interest ´0.0032**
(0.0014)
Commodity ´0.0016
(0.0016)
Industry-adjusted leverage 0.0320***
(0.0057)
Book-to-market 0.0626***
(0.0130)
Illiquidity 0.0417***
(0.0072)
Size ´0.0345***
(0.0097)
Number of segments ´0.0029
(0.0021)
Ownership30 ´0.0072
(0.0135)
Ownership30` ´0.0195***
(0.0069)
Number of observations 1855
Number of derivatives users 1331
Number of derivatives non-users 524
Adjusted R2 0.0509
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Table 9
Changes in the cost of equity and risk characteristics of new users of derivatives
The table reports changes in the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost of equity, and market, small-minus-big
(SMB), and high-minus-low (HML) factor betas, and expected default frequency (EDF) for a sample of 86
German non-financial firms that initiated derivatives programs during the sample period. A firm is categorized
as a new user of derivatives if it reports derivatives use in year t, but does not report a position in derivatives
prior to year t. See also notes to Table 2.
Variable Mean change Median change Std. dev.
Cost of equity ´0.0246*** ´0.0253*** 0.0175
Industry-adjusted cost of equity ´0.0286*** ´0.0287*** 0.0151
Market beta ´0.0750*** ´0.0778*** 0.1248
SMB beta ´0.0192*** ´0.0185*** 0.0347
HML beta ´0.0209** ´0.0227** 0.0932
1-year EDF ´0.0193** ´0.0205** 0.0888
5-year EDF ´0.0155** ´0.0179** 0.0721
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Table 10
Derivatives use and EDF: Pooled OLS regressions
The table reports the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of the relation between a sample
of German non-financial firms’ expected default frequency (EDF) and their use of derivatives. The regression
in column 1 considers 1-year EDF as the dependent variable, while the regression in column 2 considers 5-year
EDF as the dependent variable. Equity volatility of a firm is first computed as the standard deviation over one
year of daily returns and subsequently annualized by multiplying by
?
252. Excess return is calculated as the
stock i ’s annual return minus the annual return on the value-weighted market portfolio. Numbers in parenthe-
ses are standard errors corrected for simultaneous clustering on firm and year. See also notes to Tables 2 through 4.
1-year EDF 5-year EDF
Intercept 0.0317*** 0.0306***
(0.0060) (0.0042)
Derivatives use ´0.0284*** ´0.0215***
(0.0016) (0.0014)
Industry-adjusted leverage 0.0243*** 0.0230***
(0.0047) (0.0036)
Return on assets ´0.0212*** ´0.0205***
(0.0072) (0.0061)
Excess return ´0.0108*** ´0.0096***
(0.0013) (0.0010)
Quick ratio ´0.0022*** ´0.0019***
(0.0005) (0.0004)
Size ´0.0259*** ´0.0318***
(0.0028) (0.0021)
Equity volatility 0.0013*** 0.0011***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Illiquidity 0.0633** 0.0489***
(0.0273) (0.0185)
Number of observations 1855
Number of derivatives users 1331
Number of derivatives non-users 524
Adjusted R2 0.3803 0.4367
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Table 11
Derivatives use and EDF: Simultaneous equations analysis
The table reports results of the relation between firms’ 1-year (5-year) expected default frequency (EDF),
derivatives use, and industry-adjusted leverage, estimated within a simultaneous equations framework. In the
first stage, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the industry-adjusted leverage and a probit regression
for the derivatives use decision are run separately. In the second stage, structural equations are estimated
where the relevant explanatory variables are replaced with the predicted values from the first-stage regressions.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. See also notes to Tables 2 through 4 and 10.
Dependent variable: 1-year EDF 5-year EDF Derivatives Leverage
Variable/estimation method OLS OLS Probit OLS
Intercept 0.0343** 0.0351** ´1.7374*** 0.0764*
(0.0171) (0.0179) (0.3579) (0.0393)
Endogenous variables
Derivatives use ´0.0293*** ´0.0223*** 0.0434***
(0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0178)
Industry-adjusted leverage 0.0797*** 0.0737*** 0.2331***
(0.0089) (0.0059) (0.0631)
Exogenous variables
Return on assets ´0.0214*** ´0.0207*** ´0.1498**
(0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0630)
Excess return ´0.0198*** ´0.0176***
(0.0017) (0.0019)
Quick ratio ´0.0019*** ´0.0016*** ´0.0733**
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0343)
Size ´0.0387*** ´0.0405*** 0.4764*** 0.0424***
(0.0088) (0.0074) (0.0769) (0.0045)
Equity volatility 0.0016*** 0.0012***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Illiquidity 0.0669** 0.0521***
(0.0294) (0.0204)
Book-to-market ´0.1943 0.0736***
(0.1534) (0.0165)
Number of segments ´0.0055
(0.0059)
Foreign sales to net sales 1.6470***
(0.3145)
Property, plant, and equipment 0.2320***
(0.0434)
Depreciation ´0.4462**
(0.2211)
SGA expenses ´0.0684
(0.0498)
Number of observations 1855
Number of derivatives users 1331
Number of derivatives non-users 524
Adjusted R2 0.4551 0.4595 0.1289
Log-likelihood ´780.2712
Sargan-Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.2629 0.2682
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Table A.1
Descriptive statistics
The table reports descriptive statistics for characteristics of a sample of derivatives user and non-user German non-financial firms used in the empirical analysis. The sample
period is from 1999 to 2009. See also notes to Tables 2 through 4 and 10.
Variable All firms Derivatives users Derivatives non-users Difference tests
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
t-test Wilcoxon test
Industry-adjusted leverage 1984 0.0395 0.0448 1388 0.0512 0.0564 596 0.0121 0.0178 0.0391*** 0.0386***
Book-to-market 1984 0.7024 0.6203 1388 0.6934 0.5882 596 0.7233 0.6952 ´0.0299** ´0.1070
Illiquidity 1984 0.0187 0.0159 1388 0.0139 0.0106 596 0.0298 0.0282 ´0.0159*** ´0.0176***
Size 1984 5.9800 5.6903 1388 6.7050 6.3189 596 4.2915 4.2265 2.4135*** 2.0924***
Number of segments 1984 3.3669 3.0000 1388 3.6070 3.0000 596 2.8077 3.0000 0.7993*** 0.0000
Quick ratio 1984 0.5215 0.4369 1388 0.3851 0.2668 596 0.8390 0.8331 ´0.4359*** ´0.5663***
Foreign sales to net sales 1984 0.3660 0.3370 1388 0.4564 0.4817 596 0.1554 0.0000 0.3010*** 0.4817***
Depreciation 1984 0.0341 0.0284 1388 0.0366 0.0313 596 0.0284 0.0218 0.0082*** 0.0095***
Return on assets 1984 4.5284 4.7956 1388 4.7944 5.1200 596 3.9090 4.0400 0.8854*** 1.0800***
SGA expenses 1984 0.2164 0.1629 1388 0.2390 0.1922 596 0.3001 0.2359 ´0.0886*** ´0.0406***
Property, plant, and equipment 1984 0.2208 0.1813 1388 0.2433 0.2200 596 0.1683 0.0911 0.0750*** 0.1289***
Equity volatility 1984 0.4325 0.4214 1388 0.4155 0.4031 596 0.4720 0.4639 ´0.0565*** ´0.0608***
Excess Return 1984 0.1632 0.1696 1388 0.1542 0.1600 596 0.1841 0.1920 ´0.0299*** ´0.0320***
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Table A.2
Correlations of firm characteristics
The table reports Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients of firm characteristics. Numbers in italic denote statistical significance at the 1% level. See also notes to
Tables 2 through 4 and 10.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Industry-adjusted cost of equity (1) 1.0000
Market beta (2) 0.4670 1.0000
SMB beta (3) 0.4800 0.0874 1.0000
HML beta (4) 0.4812 0.0820 0.0778 1.0000
Industry-adjusted leverage (5) 0.0770 0.0424 0.0449 0.0655 1.0000
Book-to-market (6) 0.0950 0.0379 ´0.2693 0.0598 0.0737 1.0000
Illiquidity (7) 0.0410 0.0806 ´0.0641 ´0.1309 ´0.0976 0.2191 1.0000
Size (8) ´0.0289 ´0.0533 ´0.0605 ´0.0677 0.1647 ´0.0332 ´0.2829 1.0000
Number of segments (9) ´0.0045 ´0.0203 ´0.0316 ´0.0545 ´0.0566 0.0291 ´0.0752 0.4871 1.0000
Quick ratio (10) ´0.0128 0.0142 0.0325 ´0.0699 ´0.2341 ´0.0317 ´0.0111 ´0.1980 ´0.1180 1.0000
Foreign sales to net sales (11) ´0.0083 ´0.0529 0.0501 ´0.0289 0.0634 0.0064 ´0.1522 0.4264 0.1848 ´0.0820 1.0000
Depreciation (12) ´0.0179 0.0187 ´0.0298 ´0.0589 ´0.0766 0.0666 0.0377 0.1356 0.1066 ´0.1573 ´0.0209 1.0000
Return on assets (13) ´0.0293 ´0.0934 0.0208 ´0.0050 ´0.0110 ´0.1712 ´0.1362 0.1572 0.0218 ´0.0672 0.0998 ´0.0679 1.0000
SGA expenses (14) ´0.0035 0.0274 0.0197 0.0318 ´0.1382 ´0.1524 ´0.0726 ´0.2796 ´0.1525 0.0209 ´0.0568 0.0262 ´0.0447 1.0000
Property, plant, and equipment (15) ´0.0259 ´0.0278 ´0.0182 ´0.0884 0.2579 0.0972 0.0313 0.2988 0.1709 ´0.1647 ´0.0258 0.6114 0.0752 ´0.2108 1.0000
Equity volatility (16) 0.0653 0.0469 ´0.2207 0.0886 ´0.0788 0.1588 ´0.1952 ´0.4100 ´0.1642 0.1802 ´0.1504 ´0.1080 ´0.3066 0.0668 ´0.2546 1.0000
Excess return (17) ´0.0492 0.0652 0.5264 0.0519 ´0.0584 ´0.3413 ´0.0019 ´0.0366 ´0.0293 0.0403 ´0.0049 ´0.0163 0.1835 0.0239 ´0.0426 0.0414 1.0000
1-year EDF (18) 0.0227 0.1086 0.1682 0.0130 0.1414 0.3597 0.2346 ´0.2108 ´0.0567 ´0.0526 ´0.0740 ´0.0472 ´0.3056 0.0287 ´0.0683 0.4524 ´0.1853 1.0000
5-year EDF (19) 0.0174 0.1083 0.1842 0.0083 0.1515 0.3957 0.2403 ´0.2366 ´0.0751 ´0.0525 ´0.0876 ´0.0658 ´0.3324 ´0.0348 ´0.0618 0.4786 ´0.1996 0.9744 1.0000
40
Table A.3
Univariate comparison of derivatives users and non-users: Cost of equity computed using weekly returns
The table reports mean and median values of the cost of equity, industry-adjusted cost of equity, and market, small-minus-big (SMB), and high-minus-low (HML) factor
betas for a sample of derivatives user and non-user German non-financial firms. The setup is the same as in Table 2 except that weekly returns are used to compute the cost
of equity of a firm. See also notes to Table 2.
Variable All firms Derivatives users Derivatives non-users Difference tests
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
t-test Wilcoxon test
Cost of equity 1984 0.0837 0.0838 1388 0.0747 0.0743 596 0.1048 0.1059 ´0.0301*** ´0.0317***
Industry-adjusted cost of equity 1984 0.0049 0.0057 1388 0.0019 0.0023 596 0.0119 0.0137 ´0.0100*** ´0.0114***
Market beta 1984 0.9032 0.9378 1388 0.8107 0.8299 596 1.1187 1.1892 ´0.3080** ´0.3593***
SMB beta 1984 0.6164 0.5646 1388 0.5106 0.4551 596 0.8629 0.8197 ´0.3523*** ´0.3646**
HML beta 1984 0.3413 0.3399 1388 0.3207 0.3259 596 0.3893 0.3725 ´0.0686*** ´0.0466**
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Table A.4
Pooled OLS regressions: Cost of equity computed using weekly returns
The table reports the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of the relation between a sample of
German non-financial firms’ industry-adjusted cost of equity and their use of derivatives. The setup is the same
as in Table 3 except that weekly returns are used to compute the cost of equity of a firm. See also notes to Table 3.
Model 1 Model 2
Intercept 0.0257*** 0.0283***
(0.0063) (0.0069)
Derivatives use ´0.0154*** ´0.0140***
(0.0029) (0.0029)
Industry-adjusted leverage 0.0487*** 0.0559***
(0.0034) (0.0041)
Book-to-market 0.0695*** 0.0637***
(0.0089) (0.0094)
Illiquidity 0.0456*** 0.0401***
(0.0082) (0.0081)
Size ´0.0376*** ´0.0362***
(0.0083) (0.0079)
Number of segments ´0.0031 ´0.0034
(0.0019) (0.0019)
Ownership30 ´0.0073
(0.0097)
Ownership30` ´0.0177***
(0.0054)
Number of observations 1855
Number of derivatives users 1331
Number of derivatives non-users 524
Adjusted R2 0.0439 0.0540
42
